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Please do not circulate.
Abstract
We present a spatial map of the Italian House during the XIII Leg-
islature obtained by applying the Poole and Rosenthal methodology to
roll call data. We obtain coordinates for almost all the 650 MPs that
were on the House's °oor at the time, and we aggregate them accord-
ing to parties. We ¯nd that voting patters generate basically a two
dimensional political space. The ¯rst dimension represents loyalty to
either the ruling coalition or the opposing one. The second dimension
may describe di®erences at the constitutional level. This ¯nding is con-
sistent with the exceptional case of the party Northern League, which
at the time did not belong to either coalition, and presented itself as
a northern and anti-system party. Last, we compute the average dis-
persion of party coordinates along each dimension and compare them
with the Rice index of cohesion, the agreement index (which takes into
account abstention), and one other index we construct to account for
absence from voting. We ¯nd that absence is signi¯cantly correlated
with the dispersion of parties along the second dimension. We use this
to motivate the importance of further analysis on the massive absence
in Italian Parliament from voting sessions.
¤We would like to thank Keith Poole for his availability in providing the software and
in helping with it. Clearly, we are the sole responsible for any mistake. We would also
like to thank Francesca Benvenuti for her excellent research assistance. Financial support
from Singapore Management University is gratefully acknowledged.
11 Introduction
This paper o®ers a spatial map of the Italian political space as it unravels
from the ¯nal votes cast by the members of the House (the lower chamber
of the Italian Parliament) in the course of the XIII legislature (1996-2001).
We apply the methodology developed and applied to the U.S. Congress by
Poole and Rosenthal [10] (PR henceforth) and we then address three basic
questions: 1) what is the dimensionality of the Italian party system? 2)
What do these dimensions mean? 3) How do our results relate to previous
spatial studies? Further, we look at how party cohesion is related to disper-
sion in each dimension of the political space, and we ¯nd some suggestive
evidence about the strategic role played by absence from and abstention in
voting sessions.
The Italian political space has been investigated for the past three decades,
under a variety of methodologies and in di®erent time frameworks: Party
positions have been estimated by using expert surveys data (Warwick [15]),
mass survey data (Sani and Sartori [14], Corbetta, Parisi and Schadee [3]),
ecological data (Ricol¯ [11]), and party manifesto data (Budge et alii [1],
Campus [4], and Pelizzo [8]).
Little agreement has been achieved about the number and the nature of
the dimensions of the political space under investigation. Some have in fact
suggested that the Italian political space is or can be properly represented
as uni-dimensional, with parties ordered along the (ideological) left-right
dimension. This is the interpretation given by Sani and Sartori [14] for
the mid seventies, by Corbetta, Parisi and Schadee [3] for the 1966-1983
period, by Campus [4] for the 1996 elections, and by Pelizzo [8] for the
1948-1996 period. Others have argued that the Italian political space is
multi-dimensional. This is the evidence found by Ricol¯ [11] and [12] for
the periods 1953-1992 and 1994-1996, by Loera and Testa [7] who have in-
vestigated the dimensionality of the perceptual space of the voters in the
new millennium. It is however interesting to note that the scholars advocat-
ing the multi-dimensional interpretation of the Italian political space have
not reached a consensus as to what are the structuring dimensions of the
Italian political space. For several decades it was believed that the ¯rst di-
mension of the Italian political space was the left-right dimension and that
the second dimension divided pro-system parties from anti-system parties
(Sani [13]). Recent studies have instead suggested not only that the second
dimension might have a di®erent meaning (Ricol¯ and Testa 2002) but also
that the left-right dimension may no longer represent the main dimension
of the Italian political space (Ricol¯ [9] [page 31]).
2By applying the PR methodology, we can estimate the political coor-
dinates of each party and the dimensionality of the political space as they
unravel from voting behaviors in the House. We ¯nd that the Italian politi-
cal space is best understood as two-dimensional, and we discuss the nature
of these two political dimensions. Speci¯cally we argue that the ¯rst dimen-
sion structuring the parliamentary party system is the loyalty to the group
each party belongs to, either Freedom Pole (Polo) or Olive tree (Ulivo),
while the second dimension re°ects di®erences at Constitutional level that
are somehow related to the North-South cleavage. Moreover, we estimate
parties' dispersion along each dimension, which constitutes another element
of inter-party di®erences and similarities, and we ¯nd that dispersion on each
dimension relates to di®erent factors. In particular, dispersion on the ¯rst
dimension is smaller and signi¯cantly correlated with the Rice agreement in-
dex. On the other hand, dispersion on the second dimension is signi¯cantly
correlated with an agreement index we generate to account for absence in
voting sessions. We take this as suggestive evidence of the strategic and yet
not very well understood role of absenteeism in parliamentary dynamics.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses
the data we collected, section 3 describes in some detail the PR methodology;
section 4 reports the spatial map so obtained and discusses the dimensional-
ity of the political space and its interpretation, while section 5 discusses the
relationship between the parties' cohesion and the nature of these political
dimensions. Section 6 discusses some possible implications of our ¯ndings
and suggests some possible venues for future research.
2 The data
Voting procedure in the Italian Parliament is very elaborate. In the
standing orders of the House at least twelve articles (with several sub-
articles) that discipline parliamentary votes. In particular, any time the
number of Yea (Nay ) exceeds Nay (Yea ) and at least half of the MPs are
participating to the vote (i.e. if the quorum is met), a bill is passed (re-
jected). MPs that are absent because on duty, are considered as present in
the computation of the quorum. Similarly, MPs that show up but abstain,
i.e. do not express either Nay or Yea , are considered as present.
Voting is managed electronically or can be done by raising hand (the
most common), by splitting the house in two groups, or by roll call. In some
speci¯c instances, such as for bills dealing with human and family rights,
3constitutional bodies, and electoral rules, voting is secret. In other cases,
bills may be passed within Committees, without involving the whole House.
(See article 92.1 of the standing orders.)
During the XIII Legislature, 905 bills were published in the Gazzetta
U±ciale. 1 Some may have been approved during the previous Legislature,
some may have been passed with secret vote, while some others may have
been approved within Commissions. As a result we a have track of vot-
ing records for 630 bills. The House hosts 630 MPs, but because of some
turnover we have a record of as many as 651 of them. For each bill we know
whether each MPs was absent, on a justi¯ed absence, present and voted Yea
, or Nay or abstained. We just coded votes Yea and Nay while treated all
the other cases as missing. The dataset so created has been used to estimate
MP's policy positions according to the PR methodology, which we describe
in the next section. 2
3 The methodology
The methodology of estimating roll calls developed by PR is based on a
spatial model of probabilistic voting in which MPs are assumed to have single
peaked preferences, represented by a normal utility function, over an n-
dimensional space (to be determined empirically). From now on we will refer
to these peaks as MPs' bliss points or MPs' coordinates interchangeably.
MPs vote for the alternative (Yea or Nay ) they prefer the most. The
probability of making a mistake when voting is normally distributed and
i.i.d across roll calls and alternatives.
As a consequence, the payo® associated to the, say, Yea outcome of roll







where ¯ is a scaling factor which is proportional to the variance of the
error term, wk are the salience weights, and d2
ijky is the squared distance
of legislator i from the Yea outcome along the dimension k. By letting
²ijk denote the error term, it follows that the distribution of the di®erence
between the two utilities is
U(i;j;y) ¡ U(i;j;n) » N(u(i;j;n) ¡ u(i;j;y);¾2);
1The source is the House itself, through its web-site: http://www.camera.it
2A detailed explanation of the PR methodology is in Poole [9].





It is possible to estimate MPs' bliss points as well as each roll call coordinate
(one for the Yea and one for the Nay outcome). The procedure is called
NOMINATE and is based on a three steps algorithm: ¯rst, given some
reasonable initial values of the MPs' bliss points, the roll call parameters
are estimated; second, given those estimation of the roll call parameters,
a new estimation for the MPs' bliss points is obtained. Last, given both
MPs' bliss points and roll call points, the utility function parameters are
estimated. 3 The next section reports our ¯ndings and the spatial map of
the Italian Parliament.
4 Spatial analysis
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of our estimations. The ¯rst row
reports the number of bills that are in the dataset, the second indicates the
cuto® criterium used for rejecting the bills; thus roll calls with a majority of
at least 97.5% were not considered in the estimation. This is a traditional
cuto® rule. We also tried several less stringent cuto® rules, to decrease
the number of roll calls that were discharged, but the results, in terms of
goodness of ¯t, do not improve. As a result, 388 roll calls were rejected (line
three) and 242 were accepted (line four).
Similar numbers (rows ¯ve and seven) are reported for the number of
MPs that were available (650) and those who were rejected (9). The cuto®
criterium of 20 (which is still standard) means that only MPs for which there
is a record of voting in at least 20 roll calls are considered (line six). Thus
we could get coordinates for 642 MPs.
The remaining rows in table 1 show the goodness of ¯t statistics (per-
centage of correct classi¯ed - PCC, and aggregate proportional reduction in
error - APRE) if we estimate a model with one, two or three dimensions. 4
3A more general version, (DW-)NOMINATE, allows for more sophisticated estimations
of MPs bliss points, as it takes into account their voting patterns across legislatures. As
data about the Italian Parliament have just started to unfold, at present we can only
con¯ne ourselves to the static version of this procedure.
4PCC is just the percentage of the correct predictions that are generated by the es-
timated model. APRE instead is explaining how the model can improved with respect
to the trivial prediction all MPs vote according to the majority. It is computed in the
5Roll-calls read 630













APRE(2) - APRE(1) 6.8%
APRE(3) - APRE(2) 1.1%












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Figure 1: Normalized eigenvalues of the double centered agreement score
matrix. The elbow is a good indicator of the dimensionality of the space.
Finally, the last three rows report the improvement in APRE if we increase
by one the dimensionality of the model.
The ¯rst question of interest is about the dimensionality of the political
space. How many dimensions do we have? Figure 1 reports the plot of the
normalized eigenvalues of the double centered agreement score matrix. A
good way to understand the dimensionality of the political space, in fact,








and it is equal to 0 when the model does not improve on the benchmark case, and 1 when
the model achieves perfect classi¯cation. Note that APRE can also be negative, whenever
the model generates more errors than the simple benchmark.
7Classi¯cation H Max spread NH
TESEO 0.088 0.0625 0.027
OURS 0.097 0.0625 0.037
Clausen 0.23 0.167 0.08
Peltzman 0.13 0.083 0.05
Table 2: Dispersion indexes for bills. H is Her¯ndahl index. Max spread is
the minimum value for H. NH is the normalized Her¯ndahl index.
likely that the dimension is either two or three. In order to have a better
understanding of the dimensionality, we look at the improvements in APRE
when we increase by one the dimension. Table 1 shows that an increase from
one to two dimensions improves APRE by 6.8 percentage points. Moving
further to three dimensions only improves APRE by 1.1 percentage points.
Thus we focus our analysis on a two-dimensional space.
Since the type of bills that are proposed and passed is, to a very large ex-
tent, endogenous to the legislative process, while we treat them as exogenous
in our estimations, we decided to make sure that the low dimensionality is
not just an artifact of this issue. To this end we coded the bills according to
three main classi¯cation (Clausen, Peltzman, and TESEO) and one other
classi¯cation we made on our own (OURS). TESEO is the classi¯cation of
bills that is provided by the House itself. 5 We then computed the Her¯ndahl
concentration index for any of the above mentioned classi¯cations, and then
we normalized it in such a way that it ranges between 0 (maximum spread,
that is even distribution, of the bills) and 1 (maximum concentration of bills
in one category). 6 Table 2 reports our ¯ndings for any classi¯cation of the
bills we adopted. The worst possible case is if we look at the Clausen clas-
si¯cation, which has the smallest number of categories. Even so, we have
that NH is at 8%, so that the variety of bills passed is just 8% far away
from an even distribution. Therefore the low dimensionality in the Italian
Parliament is not a mere artifact of the legislative process, and we can now
move onto understanding the meaning of these two dimensions.
5In the appendix we report both TESEO and OURS classi¯cations. Clausen and
Peltzman can be found, for example, in Poole and Rosenthal [10].
6Speci¯cally, if we let pi denote the percentage of bills within category i = 1;¢¢¢ ;n, the




i. Whenever the bills are evenly split, H = 1=n.
Whenever bills are concentrated on one category only, H = 1. Our normalization generates
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Figure 2: Distribution of unconstrained bills by cutting line angles
Cutting line angles provide a useful way to understand which dimension
is playing an important role in each roll call. In particular, any time the
cutting line is (close to) vertical, we know that voting goes according to the
¯rst dimension. Similarly, when the cutting line is (close to) horizontal, we
know that voting is mainly determined by the second dimension. Figure 2
reports the distribution of the unconstrained bills by cutting line angles.
Unconstrained estimations are those where the cutting line angle is not
forced to be on one of the edges of the space. As we can see, the mode of
the distribution is represented by bills with vertical cutting lines. Despite the
fact that the Italian political arena is characterized by a multiparty system,
the XIII Legislatures o®ers us the possibility to compare the voting patterns
within two main coalitions: Ulivo and Polo. Thus we de¯ne party-line votes
whenever at least 90% of the Ulivo coalition voted against at least 90% of
the Polo coalition. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the unconstrained







10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180
Figure 3: Distribution of unconstrained bills with party-line vote by cutting
line angles
10angles are closer to vertical when party-line votes are present.
So, what do these dimensions mean? Figures 4 and 5 report the spatial
maps obtained by, respectively, taking the mean and the median of each
party member's coordinates. 7 Like in the case for the U.S. Congress (see
Poole and Rosenthal [10]) the ¯rst dimension is an expression of loyalty to
the coalition the group belongs to. From left to right, we have groups more
loyal to Ulivo, groups less loyal to either Ulivo or Polo, and groups loyal to
the Polo. 8 We tested this hypotheses by analyzing all the bills where party
line vote was present. In particular, we computed the change in APRE if we
move from one to two dimensions and we found that it is about 3.7%, which
con¯rms us that party line is the main determinant of the ¯rst dimension.
Under this perspective, it is not surprising that the Party of the Commu-
nist Reformation (PRC), a neo-communist party, is not at the far left of the
¯rst dimension. Their support for the Ulivo coalition has been pretty weak
in the ¯rst years of the legislature, and has formally stopped when Prodi
resigned from Prime Minister after losing a vote of no con¯dence from PRC
themselves on October 9, 1998. In that period PRC also faced the depar-
ture of some of its members, who were more pro-Ulivo and decided to form
a new neo-communist party, Party of the Italian Communists (PdCI). Their
position in the ¯rst dimension is consistently to the left of PRC because,
unlike the latter, they o®ered a support to the center left government that
followed. Another interesting aspect of PRC comes by comparing the mean
and the median position. In fact, the median member is more loyal to the
Ulivo coalition than its average member, who nevertheless was more repre-
sentative of the party stated position.
At the other extreme of the ¯rst dimension we have LN. A member of
the center-right coalition during the XIII Legislature, LN caused the crisis
of Mr Berlusconi's government which eventually led to early elections in
which the this party ran alone against Roma-ladrona (Rome big thief) of
both Roma-Polo and Roma-Ulivo. Thus in the XIII Legislature, LN repre-
sents the case of opposition to both coalitions, and its location to the right
indicates its proximity to Polo more than Ulivo. In fact, during the cur-
rent (XIV) Legislature, the LN belongs to the Polo which constitutes the
majority coalition.
As for the second dimension, the ¯rst hypothesis that comes to mind
7Speci¯cally, we followed this two steps process: ¯rst, we computed the average (me-
dian) of MP's coordinates by group in each bill, considering only those MPs that actually
voted on that bill. Our score is the group average across all bills.
8At the extreme right-end of the spectrum, we have a noticeable exception, the North-






















































































































































































































































































































13by looking at the scatter plot is that it represents the North - South spec-
trum. Parties whose electoral support was greater in the North than in the
other parts of the peninsula are located near the upper end of the second
dimension. Parties whose success was mostly due to the Southern votes are
located near the lower end of the second dimension, while the parties which
had the best electoral performance in Center Italy, are located in between
the other two clusters of parties (Cartocci [2][page 195]). We computed the
correlation of each party's percentage total vote at Northern Italian regions
with the party's second dimension, and we found that sign is positive (r
=. 402). Similarly, we computed the correlation of each party's percentage
total vote at the Southern Italian regions with the party's second dimension
and we found almost identical results but with the (expected) opposite sign
(r = -.395). Such a territorial component could emerge from bills focused on
Southern areas (which belong to category 7 of TESEO). Unfortunately there
are not enough observations to look at changes in APRE from one to two
dimensions because of regional factors. On the other hand, the territorial
factor could as well emerged from bills related to constitutional matters. In
fact, the territorial cleavage was a heated issue for most of the XIII Leg-
islature not only because LN was advocating a secession of the Northern
regions, had created a Parliament for Padania and had held mock elections
for the Padanian parliament, but also because the reform of the form of
state was one of the main issues of the reformist agenda of the Bicameral
Committee for the constitutional reforms presided over by D'Alema. The
debates as to how to reform the Italian form of state opposed the parties
in favor of preserving the unitary form of state and were generally stronger
in central and southern Italy to the parties advocating a reform of the form
of state and were stronger in the Northern Regions. The fact that the Bi-
cameral Commission basically ended up as a big failure, since no agreement
was found, led us think as the possible correlation between territorial and
constitutional interests. Our analysis reveal actually that constitutionalism
provides the best explanation for the change in the dimensionality of the
political space in the Italian parliament and, indirectly, for our interpreta-
tion of the second dimension as territorial. In fact, to test this hypothesis
we once again looked at the change in APRE if we move from one to two
dimensions by restring our attention to bills within the same category in
each of the bills classi¯cations. In particular, we restricted our attention to
only those categories with at least 10 roll calls and changes in APRE above
20%. Not surprisingly we ¯nd that neither the Clausen nor the Peltzman
categories ¯t well the Italian case. With the TESEO classi¯cation, we ¯nd
that the most signi¯cative changes in APRE are related to the following
14categories: 1 (Constitutional matters) , 4 (Health), 9 (Labor), and 11 (Pro-
ductive activities). With OURS classi¯cation, we have that only category 1
(Constitutional matters) is relevant. (Tables 8 through 10 in the appendix
show our ¯ndings.)
Similarly, we looked at the changes in APRE by moving to a two di-
mensional model in the cases were cutting line angles were close to either
0 (namely less than 20) or 180 (namely greater than 160) degrees. Those
cases are rolls calls were the second dimension plays a major role. In fact the
changes in APRE are huge. We then looked at the distribution of categories
of bills in this set. We found that Constitutional matters is one of them, but
not the only one. In OURS, all the bills who represent rati¯cations, dele-
gations, extensions of deadline are even more numerous. Figures 11 and 12
in the appendix report the distributions of bills according to TESEO and
OURS classi¯cation whose cutting line angle is almost °at.
5 Party cohesion within the House.
A second measure of interest we can obtain from individual MPs' co-
ordinates is the groups' standard deviations, which we take as a measure
of group's cohesion. We think this is an interesting alternative measure of
party cohesion because it comes directly from a structural model of congres-
sional voting. In fact, as Desposato [5] points out, standard cohesion scores
do not always provide accurate estimates of parties cohesion, just because
they lack an underlying model of congressional voting. As an example, he
shows that in a random utility model of legislative behavior, those standard
scores tend to overestimate the cohesion of small parties. Another reason
of interest of our measure of cohesion lies in the fact that dispersion scores
account for the dimensionality of politics and political behavior. Hence they
do not only allow the analyst to measure parties' cohesion, but they also al-
low the analyst to assess party cohesion on each of the dimensions of a given
political space and, therefore, to investigate whether and to what extent
cohesion is a®ected by the nature of the political issues that are relevant on
each dimension.
By performing our analysis of party's cohesion, we found that the Italian
parties di®ered from each other not only because they occupy di®erent posi-
tions in the political space (average of the positions occupied by the various
MPs belonging to a party) but also because they display di®erent levels of





Size -0.196 -0.121 1.000
(0.437) (0.633)
Table 3: Correlations between dispersions on each dimension and size. As-
terisk indicates value that is signi¯cant at 0:05 level or better. Values in
brackets are the signi¯cance levels.
Democrats of the Left (DS) or PdCI display low levels of dispersion, others
like the Segni Pact or the Union of the Democrats for Europe (UDEUR) dis-
play much higher levels. So parties have di®erent degrees of homogeneity.
The ¯rst factor a®ecting parties' homogeneity is represented by the nature
of political issues or the nature of the political dimension. Let's go Italy
(FI),UDEUR, Mixed Group, Italian renewal (RI) and the Segni Pact are
more homogeneous on the ¯rst dimension, while the all the other parties
are more homogeneous on the second dimension. In general we ¯nd that
dispersion along the ¯rst dimension is positively correlated with dispersion
along the second dimension, but that dispersion along either dimension is
not signi¯cantly correlated with the size of the party. (See table 3) We can
push the analysis a step further and ask: what factors are related to parties'
dispersion on the two dimensions? In order to answer this question, we cor-
relate the estimates concerning parties' dispersion on each axis with three
measures of cohesion, namely the Rice index, the Agreement Index (AI)
proposed by Hix, Noury and Roland [6], and the Modi¯ed Agreement Index
(MAI), proposed by us. The basic di®erence between these three measures
of cohesion concerns the number of voting options that are available to MPs.
There are two voting options (yes, no) considered by the Rice index, there
are three voting options (yes, no, abstain) considered by AI, and there are
four voting options (yes, no, abstain, absence) considered by MAI. 9 The
9Speci¯cally, let sij, nij, aij and hij be, respectively, the number of MPs for group j










16measures of party cohesion and on parties' dispersion on both axes are pre-
sented in table 4. The need to develop this new index of cohesion resulted
from the fact that the number of MPs abstaining if fairly small, the number
of MPs being absent is fairly high. This form of legislative behavior cannot
be simply explained by the fact that individual MPs have something else
or more important to do. The analysis of the votes on the ¯nal bills in the
Italian chamber of deputies reveals that for some bills the MPs of all the
major opposition parties (LN, FI, and National Alliance, AN) either stayed
home or abstained from voting, thus lowering the quorum needed to approve
the bills. One may therefore ask oneself whether this form of behavior is
an explicit support from the opposition members to a divided, undisciplined
government coalition, to pass some crucial bills in the Legislature. Other
hypothesis may be of interest as well. Mass absence can, for example, be
a sign of protest against the bill being voted on, or even a (failed) attempt
to avoid meeting the quorum. Given the possible strategic signi¯cance of
absence and abstention, these two phenomena should be considered as one
of the voting options, and should hence be taken into consideration to prop-
erly measure parties' cohesion. Having measured parties' cohesion on the
basis of these there indexes, we correlate them with parties' dispersion on
each dimension.
By performing these two sets of analysis, we ¯nd that the correlation
coe±cients are all properly signed and suggest that parties' cohesion de-
clines when parties become more dispersed. Furthermore, we ¯nd that the
correlation between dispersion on each dimension is not signi¯cantly (from
a statistical point of view) related to two measures of cohesion. Dispersion
on the ¯rst dimension relates signi¯cantly only to the Index of Agreement,
while the dispersion on the second dimension relates signi¯cantly only to the
MAI index. This ¯nding is relevant for three reasons. First because it shows
that the party dispersion on the two axes relates to di®erent factors. On the
¯rst dimension, which basically captures the government-opposition con°ict,
parties' dispersion relates to how MPs vote when they are present. On the






maxfsij;nij;aijg ¡ 1=2(sij + nij + aij ¡ maxfsij;nij;aijg)
sij + nij + aij
;






maxfsij;nij;aij;hijg ¡ 1=3(sij + nij + aij + hij ¡ maxfsij;nij;aij;hijg)
sij + nij + aij + hij
:
17Table 4: Agreement indexes for each party and dispersions along each di-
mension. FI = Let's go Italy; LN = Northern League; DS = Democrats of
the Left; DE = Democrats; PP = Popular Party; UDEUR = Union of the
Democrats for Europe; MISTO = mixed; SDI = Italian Socialist Democrats;
CCD = Christian Democratic Center; RI = Italian Renewal; PRC = Party
of the Communist Reformation; SEGNI = Segni Pact; ML = Linguistic
Minorities; VERDI = Greens; FLDR = Federation of Liberals, Democratic
and Republicans; PDCI = Party of the Italian Communists; AN = National
Alliance; UDR/CDU = Christian Democratic United.




FI 0.919 0.932 0.504 0.248 0.161
LN 0.955 0.925 0.537 0.077 0.101
DS 0.993 0.989 0.747 0.024 0.078
DE 0.982 0.969 0.543 0.077 0.150
PP 0.991 0.987 0.615 0.030 0.105
UDEUR 0.996 0.986 0.568 0.415 0.381
MISTO 0.876 0.823 0.555 0.451 0.345
SDI 0.989 0.988 0.604 0.040 0.099
CCD 0.980 0.957 0.550 0.162 0.260
RI 0.989 0.984 0.570 0.189 0.176
PRC 0.991 0.988 0.572 0.183 0.229
SEGNI 0.995 0.914 0.743 0.440 0.102
VERDI 0.978 0.945 0.603 0.062 0.165
ML 0.998 0.991 0.780 0.033 0.062
FLDR 0.998 0.989 0.779 0.044 0.083
PDCI 0.992 0.988 0.499 0.038 0.095
AN 0.951 0.938 0.529 0.126 0.290
UDR/CDU 0.970 0.936 0.523 0.122 0.235
18Rice Agreement MAI
¢X1 -.432 -.606 -.128
(.073) (.008) (.612)
¢X2 -.453 -.422 -.519
(.059) (.081) (.027)
Table 5: Correlations between dispersion of coordinates and agreement in-
dexes.
second dimension instead, which captures the Constitutional con°ict, par-
ties' dispersion relates to a metric that accounts not only for how MPs vote
when they're present but also for whether MPs are actually present. Second
this ¯nding is relevant because it further corroborates, however indirectly,
our understanding of the second dimension as a constitutional dimension.
In fact, the extent to which parties are concentrated or dispersed is a®ected
also by parties' absence rate, which provides a good indication of the im-
portance parties attach to the work of parliament and, more broadly, to
the functioning of the existing political institutions and constitutional or-
der. Finally, this ¯nding is important because it highlights the importance
of absence as a mode of legislative behavior, a topic that probably deserves
more attention than what has received so far.
6 Conclusion
This paper o®ers a spatial of the Italian House during the XIII legisla-
ture. We found that the Italian political space is virtually two-dimensional.
The ¯rst dimension is related to the loyalty to either coalition, with Ulivo
to the left of Polo. Thus, this dimension looses its typical ideological con-
notation it may have had in the ¯rst XII Legislatures, (where the electoral
system was purely proportional), and it becomes more a measure of the de-
gree with which the dialectic between government and opposition operates.
Government parties would be located the extreme left of this dimension (as
Ulivo was in power). The opposition parties would be to the right of the
Ulivo's parties. The further away, the harsher the opposition to the govern-
ment. Thus the position of LN re°ects the least compromising one within
the opposing parties.
The second dimension order parties according to the Constitutional is-
19sues. From top to bottom we have parties whose position towards a more
centralized form of government is increasingly stronger. In addition, we ¯nd
that the distribution of parties along the second dimension is correlated with
the geographic nature of parties: from top to bottom we have parties whose
support is mainly in Northern Italy, in the Red Belt and in Southern Italy.
Last, the overall eccentric position of LN is consistent with the anti-
system role played by this party during the whole legislature.
We also found that intra-party homogeneity varies from party to party
and that this variance is due to di®erent factors. Interestingly enough, party
cohesion may not be positively correlated with size. If it is true that, ceteris
paribus, it is easier to enforce party discipline in smaller parties, it is also
true that the bene¯t from doing that is bigger in larger parties. In other
words, MPs in smaller parties may be a better bargaining in the process
of votes acquisition, and this may result in higher heterogeneity for smaller
parties. Further research might show the extent to which our ¯ndings are
related to the groups' compositions and the House procedural rules. Yet we
believe that intra-party homogeneity is worth studying and may shed some
additional light on the life of parliamentary parties.
Finally, the results of our analysis underline the importance, at least in
the Italian context, of the absence from voting sessions as mode of legislative
behavior. During the XIII Legislatures, absences are not only caused by op-
portunity cost considerations. Absence is strategic. Some of the bills passed
because or despite all the members of the opposition parties stayed home
or abstained. So the questions become: are we facing a sort of agreement
between the two main forces (Polo and Ulivo) so that the opposition stays
home to lower the quorum over a divided government? Are we facing a harsh
opposition between the two main forces, so that one stays home to take as
much distance as possible (and hopefully avoiding the quorum to be met)
towards some bills? And in the ¯rst case, how should this cross-coalitional
courtesy be understood? Is it a sign or responsibility or collusion? And even
assuming that it is a sign of responsibility, how much should the responsible
party government framework be modi¯ed to account for this type of party
politics? This paper cannot provide an adequate answer for all these ques-
tions, but it provides a strong suggestion for where future research should
be going.
20A Tables and charts
In this section we report tables and charts of our ¯ndings. Table 6 report the
classi¯cation in TESEO. The code number in the second column indicates
how we aggregate those bills into 16 categories. Table 7 reports OURS
classi¯cation.
Tables 8 through 10 report the change in APRE from one to two and
from two to three dimensions by bill according to the four classi¯cations we
have analyzed. Last, tables 11 and 12 report the distribution of bills whose
cutting line angle is almost horizontal.
B Codebook and estimated coordinates
Tables 13 through 6 report individual MPs coordinates.
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Social security and welfare 9
Banks, credit and money 5
Budget 5
Stock exchange and financial activities 5
Foreign trade 2
Consumers protection 11
Culture, entertainment, sport and tourism 12
National defense and army 6
Civil liberties and civil rights 1
Commercial and corporate law 11
Law and justice 16
Energy 11
Family and childhood 7
Local and regional public finance 10
Public finance and taxes 5
Industry and craftsmanship 11
Information and communication 13
Public works and housing 14
Southern Italy and depressed areas 7
Labor and employment 9
Public order and police forces 16
Public economy and privatizations 5
Public sector 9
Regions and local autonomies 10
Health sector 4
Education and research 12
Transportations 13
Unions and workers rights 9
22Table 7: OURS Bill classi¯cations.
OURS Code
Constitutional matters 1
Law and justice 2
Foreign affairs 3
National defense and army 4
Budget, public finance and taxes 5
Public expenditure 6





Welfare ans social policy 12
Agricolture 13
Delegation, ratification, extension of terms 14
Information and communication 15
Internal affairs 16
Others 0
23Table 8: Changes in APRE in OUR classi¯cation.
TESEO APRE(2) - APRE(1) APRE(3) - APRE(2) SIZE
2 -0.098 0.040 49
5 0.200 0.018 40
9 0.286 0.033 37
16 0.019 0.048 30
12 0.198 0.021 29
6 0.199 -0.436 20
13 0.160 0.003 20
1 0.317 0.039 18
4 0.214 0.075 15
11 0.238 0.082 12
14 0.190 0.008 12
3 0.187 0.098 11
15 -0.235 -0.090 10
8 -0.151 0.185 7
10 0.297 0.042 6
7 -0.042 0.009 4
24Table 9: Changes in APRE in TESEO classi¯cation.
MASSI APRE(2) - APRE(1) APRE(3) - APRE(2) SIZE
14 0.165 0.067 45
5 0.070 0.024 33
1 0.284 0.041 20
3 0.189 0.042 20
2 0.014 0.019 15
16 0.026 0.011 15
7 0.056 0.016 12
9 0.087 0.036 9
10 -0.005 0.126 9
12 0.010 0.039 9
13 0.041 0.000 9
6 0.059 0.016 8
4 0.190 -1.383 7
11 0.295 0.110 7
15 0.354 -0.193 5
8 0.097 0.050 4
25Table 10: Changes in APRE in Peltzman and in Clausen classi¯cations.
PELTZMAN APRE(2) - APRE(1) APRE(3) - APRE(2) SIZE
1 0.110 -0.017 25
2 0.103 0.018 32
3 0.184 0.039 32
4 0.162 0.042 25
5 0.085 0.006 15
8 0.130 0.000 58
9 0.000 0.357 1
10 -0.035 -0.028 1
61 0.246 0.026 3
62 0.152 0.029 13
71 0.018 -0.221 9
72 0.099 0.000 35
CLAUSEN APRE(2) - APRE(1) APRE(3) - APRE(2) SIZE
1 0.103 0.022 85
5 0.154 -0.174 58
6 0.162 0.050 41
2 0.098 0.033 36
3 0.001 0.089 12
4 0.023 0.036 10
26Table 11: Distribution of bills according to TESEO for bills whose cutting
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28Table 13: Individual MPs coordinates.
Fullname Code X1 X2 Fullname Code X1 X2
ABATERUSSO ERNESTO 1 -0.758 -0.085 BERLINGUER LUIGI 51 -0.776 -0.102
ABBATE MICHELE 2 -0.794 -0.041 BERRUTI MASSIMO 53 0.193 -0.107
ABBONDANZIERI MARISA 3 -0.779 -0.321 BERSELLI FILIPPO 54 0.3 -0.329
ACCIARINI MARIACHIARA 4 -0.786 -0.079 BERTINOTTI FAUSTO 55 -0.569 0.822
ACIERNO ALBERTO 5 -0.087 -0.648 BERTUCCI MAURIZIO 56 0.218 -0.161
ACQUARONE LORENZO 6 -0.741 -0.12 BIANCHI GIOVANNA 57 0.788 0.616
AGOSTINI MAURO 7 -0.757 -0.048 BIANCHI GIOVANNI 58 -0.748 -0.091
ALBANESE VALERIA 8 -0.798 -0.085 BIANCHI VINCENZO 59 0.226 -0.202
ALBERTINI GIUSEPPE 9 -0.809 -0.194 BIASCO SALVATORE 60 -0.74 -0.052
ALBONI ROBERTO 10 0.344 -0.585 BICOCCHI GIUSEPPE 61 -0.557 -0.063
ALBORGHETTI DIEGO 11 0.857 0.516 BIELLI VALTER 62 -0.752 -0.073
ALEFFI GIUSEPPE 12 0.248 -0.044 BINDI ROSY 63 -0.821 -0.199
ALEMANNO GIOVANNI 13 0.303 -0.34 BIONDI ALFREDO 64 0.234 -0.239
ALOI FORTUNATO 14 0.316 -0.532 BIRICOTTI ANNAMARIA 65 -0.782 -0.077
ALOISIO FRANCESCO 15 -0.767 -0.069 BOATO MARCO 67 -0.898 0.223
ALTEA ANGELO 16 -0.747 -0.219 BOCCHINO ITALO 68 0.303 -0.405
ALVETI GIUSEPPE 17 -0.756 -0.085 BOCCIA ANTONIO 69 -0.685 -0.09
AMATO GIUSEPPE 18 0.278 -0.236 BOGHETTA UGO 70 -0.468 0.884
AMORUSO FRANCESCO 19 0.227 -0.739 BOGI GIORGIO 71 -0.751 0.122
ANDREATTA BENIAMINO 20 -0.81 -0.227 BOLOGNESI MARIDA 72 -0.765 -0.095
ANEDDA GIANFRANCO 21 0.345 -0.323 BONAIUTI PAOLO 73 0.223 -0.113
ANGELICI VITTORIO 22 -0.769 0.086 BONATO FRANCESCO 74 -0.524 0.852
ANGELINI GIORDANO 23 -0.715 -0.097 BONITO FRANCESCO 75 -0.71 -0.116
ANGELONI BERARDINO 24 0.11 -0.866 BONO NICOLA 76 0.3 -0.52
ANGHINONI UBER 25 0.843 0.538 BORDON WILLER 77 -0.785 -0.212
APOLLONI DANIELE 26 0.509 0.352 BORGHEZIO MARIO 78 0.814 0.568
APREA VALENTINA 27 0.212 -0.205 BORROMETI ANTONIO 79 -0.741 -0.084
ARACU SABATINO 28 0.155 -0.178 BOSCO RINALDO 80 0.711 0.703
ARMANI PIETRO 29 0.382 -0.43 BOSELLI ENRICO 81 -0.791 -0.023
ARMAROLI PAOLO 30 0.35 -0.606 BOVA DOMENICO 83 -0.768 -0.097
ARMOSINO MARIATERESA 31 0.268 -0.2 BRACCO FELICE 84 -0.769 -0.063
ASCIERTO FILIPPO 32 0.307 -0.362 BRANCATI ALDO 85 -0.761 -0.084
ATTILI ANTONIO 33 -0.759 -0.084 BRESSA GIANCLAUDIO 86 -0.762 -0.098
BACCINI MARIO 34 0.175 -0.195 BRUGGER SIEGFRIED 87 -0.8 0.166
BAGLIANI LUCA 35 0.625 0.439 BRUNALE GIOVANNI 88 -0.782 -0.085
BAIAMONTE GIACOMO 36 0.193 -0.112 BRUNETTI MARIO 89 -0.859 0.511
BALLAMAN EDOUARD 37 0.773 0.635 BRUNO DONATO 90 0.235 -0.18
BALOCCHI MAURIZIO 38 0.831 0.557 BRUNO EDUARDO 91 -0.905 0.426
BAMPO PAOLO 39 0.758 0.537 BUFFO GLORIA 92 -0.76 -0.067
BANDOLI FULVIA 40 -0.817 -0.081 BUGLIO SALVATORE 93 -0.743 0.008
BARBIERI ROBERTO 41 -0.794 -0.031 BUONTEMPO TEODORO 94 0.529 -0.391
BARRAL LUCIO 42 0.676 0.493 BURANI MARIA 95 0.222 -0.19
BARTOLICH ADRIA 43 -0.771 -0.051 BURLANDO CLAUDIO 96 -0.823 -0.154
BASSO MARCELLO 44 -0.773 -0.081 BUTTI ALESSIO 97 0.444 -0.584
BASTIANONI STEFANO 45 -0.495 -0.286 BUTTIGLIONE ROCCO 98 -0.172 -0.246
BATTAGLIA AUGUSTO 46 -0.776 -0.082 CACCAVARI ROCCO 99 -0.795 -0.066
BECCHETTI PAOLO 47 0.236 -0.161 CALDERISI GIUSEPPE 100 0.287 0.076
BENEDETTI DOMENICO 48 0.445 -0.468 CALDEROLI ROBERTO 101 0.86 0.511
BENVENUTO GIORGIO 49 -0.759 -0.088 CALZAVARA FABIO 102 0.737 0.407
BERGAMO ALESSANDRO 50 0.228 -0.194 CALZOLAIO VALERIO 103 -0.811 -0.168
29Table 14: Individual MPs coordinates - Continued.
Fullname Code X1 X2 Fullname Code X1 X2
CAMBURSANO RENATO 104 -0.763 0.08 COLOMBO FURIO 154 -0.767 0.026
CAMOIRANO MAURA 105 -0.768 -0.097 COLOMBO PAOLO 155 0.853 0.464
CAMPATELLI VASSILI 106 -0.755 0.027 COLOSIMO ELIO 157 0.317 -0.471
CANANZI RAFFAELE 107 -0.747 -0.048 COLUCCI GAETANO 158 0.332 -0.496
CANGEMI LUCA 108 -0.493 0.87 COMINO DOMENICO 159 0.531 0.848
CAPARINI DAVIDE 109 0.825 0.438 CONTE GIANFRANCO 160 0.279 -0.19
CAPITELLI PIERA 110 -0.735 -0.033 CONTENTO MANLIO 161 0.39 -0.541
CAPPELLA MICHELE 111 -0.747 -0.093 CONTI GIULIO 162 0.391 -0.54
CARAZZI MARIA 112 -0.854 0.456 COPERCINI PIERLUIGI 163 0.842 0.54
CARBONI FRANCESCO 113 -0.782 0.075 CORDONI ELENA 164 -0.75 0.07
CARDIELLO FRANCO 114 0.367 -0.391 CORLEONE FRANCO 165 -0.789 -0.046
CARDINALE SALVATORE 115 -0.189 -0.451 CORSINI PAOLO 166 -0.809 -0.001
CARLESI NICOLA 116 0.395 -0.582 CORVINO MICHELE 167 -0.762 -0.269
CARLI CARLO 117 -0.788 -0.067 COSENTINO NICOLA 168 0.289 -0.113
CAROTTI PIETRO 118 -0.76 -0.075 COSSUTTA ARMANDO 169 -0.78 0.615
CARRARA CARMELO 119 0.174 -0.307 COSSUTTA MAURA 170 -0.895 0.447
CARRARA NUCCIO 120 0.237 -0.187 COSTA RAFFAELE 171 0.353 0.074
CARTA CLEMENTE 121 -0.848 -0.529 COVRE GIUSEPPE 172 0.873 0.387
CARUANO GIOVANNI 122 -0.743 -0.127 CREMA GIOVANNI 173 -0.792 0.099
CARUSO ENZO 123 0.426 -0.405 CRIMI ROCCO 174 0.22 -0.1
CASCIO FRANCESCO 124 0.271 -0.205 CRUCIANELLI FAMIANO 175 -0.773 -0.082
CASILLI COSIMO 125 -0.754 -0.388 CUCCU PAOLO 176 0.228 -0.11
CASINELLI CESIDIO 126 -0.758 -0.083 CUSCUNA' ANTONIO 177 0.282 -0.547
CASINI PIERFERDINANDO 127 0.192 -0.01 CUTRUFO MAURO 178 -0.65 0.226
CASTELLANI GIOVANNI 128 -0.757 -0.074 D'ALEMA MASSIMO 179 -0.803 -0.181
CAVALIERE ENRICO 129 0.829 0.559 D'ALIA SALVATORE 180 0.153 -0.129
CAVANNA MARIELLA 130 -0.156 -0.73 DALLACHIESA NANDO 181 -0.909 0.133
CAVERI LUCIANO 131 -0.749 0.1 DALLAROSA FIORENZO 182 0.787 0.617
CE' ALESSANDRO 132 0.784 0.621 DAMERI SILVANA 183 -0.741 -0.101
CENNAMO ALDO 133 -0.756 -0.083 D'AMICO NATALE 184 -0.767 0.145
CENTO PIER PAOLO 134 -0.901 0.434 DANESE LUCA 185 -0.014 -0.713
CEREMIGNA ENZO 135 -0.708 0.118 DANIELI FRANCO 186 -0.93 0.074
CERULLI VINCENZO 136 -0.77 -0.07 DEBENETTI LINO 187 -0.921 0.233
CESARO LUIGI 137 0.202 -0.184 DECESARIS WALTER 188 -0.501 0.865
CESETTI FABRIZIO 138 -0.743 -0.089 DEFRANCISCIS FERDINANDO 189 -0.039 -0.43
CHERCHI SALVATORE 139 -0.787 -0.07 DEGHISLANZONI GIACOMO 190 0.239 -0.107
CHIAMPARINO SERGIO 140 -0.758 -0.061 DELUCA ANNAMARIA 191 0.253 -0.19
CHIAPPORI GIACOMO 141 0.844 0.469 DEMITA CIRIACO 192 -0.757 0.319
CHIAVACCI FRANCESCA 142 -0.765 -0.035 DEMURTAS GIOVANNI 193 -0.885 0.465
CHINCARINI UMBERTO 143 0.817 0.569 DEPICCOLI CESARE 194 -0.758 -0.078
CHIUSOLI FRANCO 144 -0.756 -0.05 DESIMONE ALBERTA 195 -0.771 -0.052
CIANI FABIO 145 -0.753 -0.082 DEBIASIO LUISA 196 -0.758 -0.083
CIAPUSCI ELENA 146 0.819 0.453 DEDONI ANTONINA 197 -0.758 -0.09
CICU SALVATORE 147 0.23 -0.134 DELBARONE GIUSEPPE 198 0.168 -0.353
CIMADORO GABRIELE 148 -0.079 -0.997 DELBONO EMILIO 199 -0.735 -0.117
CITO GIANCARLO 149 0.471 -0.249 DELFINO LEONE 200 -0.623 0.16
COLA SERGIO 150 0.367 -0.558 DELFINO TERESIO 201 0.094 -0.117
COLLAVINI MANLIO 151 0.233 -0.09 DELL'ELCE GIOVANNI 202 0.204 -0.205
COLLETTI LUCIO 152 0.317 0.019 DELL'UTRI MARCELLO 203 0.261 -0.261
COLOMBINI EDRO 153 0.229 -0.186 DELMASTRO SANDRO 204 0.475 -0.644
30Table 15: Individual MPs coordinates - Continued.
Fullname Code X1 X2 Fullname Code X1 X2
DEODATO GIOVANNI 205 0.187 -0.127 FRIGERIO CARLO 256 0.756 0.46
DETOMAS GIUSEPPE 206 -0.706 0.002 FRONZUTI GIUSEPPE 257 -0.117 -0.487
DIBISCEGLIE ANTONIO 207 -0.757 -0.084 FROSIO LUCIANA 258 0.732 0.463
DICAPUA FABIO 208 -0.746 0.108 FUMAGALLI MARCO 259 -0.768 -0.079
DICOMITE FRANCESCO 209 0.169 -0.14 FUMAGALLI SERGIO 260 -0.716 0.089
DIFONZO GIOVANNI 210 -0.684 0.145 GAETANI ROCCO 261 -0.816 -0.069
DILUCA ALBERTO 211 0.281 -0.149 GAGLIARDI ALBERTO 262 0.318 -0.286
DINARDO ANIELLO 212 -0.098 -0.727 GALATI GIUSEPPE 263 0.216 -0.049
DIROSA ROBERTO 213 -0.767 -0.06 GALDELLI PRIMO 264 -0.833 0.486
DISTASI GIOVANNI 214 -0.767 -0.064 GALEAZZI ALESSANDRO 265 0.338 -0.402
DILIBERTO OLIVIERO 215 -0.836 0.549 GALLETTI PAOLO 266 -0.976 0.217
D'IPPOLITO IDA 217 0.243 -0.12 GALLI DARIO 267 0.737 0.676
DIVELLA GIOVANNI 218 0.245 -0.185 GAMBALE GIUSEPPE 268 -0.922 -0.081
DOMENICI LEONARDO 219 -0.762 -0.027 GAMBATO FRANCA 269 0.66 0.524
DONNER LUCIANO 220 0.892 0.373 GARDIOL GIORGIO 270 -0.95 0.312
DOZZO GIANPAOLO 221 0.818 0.464 GARRA GIACOMO 271 0.237 -0.175
DUCA EUGENIO 222 -0.797 -0.092 GASPARRI MAURIZIO 272 0.331 -0.345
DUILIO LINO 223 -0.729 0.155 GASPERONI PIETRO 273 -0.758 -0.085
DUSSIN GUIDO 224 0.811 0.585 GASTALDI LUIGI 274 0.241 -0.171
DUSSIN LUCIANO 225 0.831 0.556 GATTO MARIO 275 -0.738 -0.17
ERRIGO DEMETRIO 226 -0.171 -0.231 GAZZARA ANTONINO 276 0.177 -0.076
EVANGELISTI FABIO 227 -0.803 -0.058 GAZZILLI MARIO 277 0.212 -0.101
FABRIS MAURO 228 0.014 -0.498 GERARDINI FRANCO 278 -0.769 -0.08
FAGGIANO COSIMO 229 -0.77 -0.083 GIACALONE SALVATORE 279 -0.745 -0.081
FANTOZZI AUGUSTO 230 -0.777 -0.185 GIACCO LUIGI 280 -0.721 -0.159
FASSINO PIERO 231 -0.753 -0.147 GIANNATTASIO PIETRO 281 0.239 -0.22
FAUSTINELLI ROBERTO 232 0.776 0.429 GIANNOTTI VASCO 282 -0.741 -0.031
FEI SANDRA 233 0.371 -0.442 GIARDIELLO MICHELE 283 -0.729 -0.111
FERRARI FRANCESCO 234 -0.766 -0.085 GIORDANO FRANCESCO 284 -0.467 0.884
FILOCAMO GIOVANNI 235 0.351 -0.317 GIORGETTI ALBERTO 285 0.361 -0.542
FINI GIANFRANCO 236 0.273 -0.269 GIORGETTI GIANCARLO 286 0.798 0.589
FINO FRANCESCO 237 0.343 -0.453 GIOVANARDI CARLO 287 0.18 -0.113
FINOCCHIARO ANNA 238 -0.734 -0.202 GIOVINE UMBERTO 288 0.235 0.022
FIORI PUBLIO 239 0.408 -0.604 GISSI ANDREA 289 0.291 -0.288
FIORONI GIUSEPPE 240 -0.759 -0.089 GIUDICE GASPARE 290 0.19 -0.09
FLORESTA ILARIO 241 0.27 -0.148 GIULIANO PASQUALE 291 0.162 0.048
FOLENA PIETRO 242 -0.765 -0.071 GIULIETTI GIUSEPPE 292 -0.716 -0.087
FOLLINI MARCO 243 0.187 -0.084 GNAGA SIMONE 293 0.782 0.552
FONGARO CARLO 244 0.803 0.596 GRAMAZIO DOMENICO 294 0.476 -0.334
FONTAN ROLANDO 245 0.761 0.649 GRIGNAFFINI GIOVANNA 295 -0.769 -0.097
FONTANINI PIETRO 246 0.725 0.469 GRILLO MASSIMO 296 0.082 -0.098
FORMENTI FRANCESCO 247 0.721 0.693 GRIMALDI TULLIO 297 -0.869 0.495
FOTI TOMMASO 248 0.462 -0.493 GRUGNETTI ROBERTO 298 0.789 0.614
FRAGALA' VINCENZO 249 0.333 -0.27 GUARINO ANDREA 299 -0.703 -0.1
FRANZ DANIELE 250 0.442 -0.546 GUERRA MAURO 300 -0.766 -0.098
FRATTA PIERALFONSO 251 0.139 -0.185 GUERZONI ROBERTO 301 -0.767 -0.085
FRATTINI FRANCO 252 0.26 -0.071 GUIDI ANTONIO 302 0.156 -0.081
FRAU AVENTINO 253 0.249 0.121 IACOBELLIS ERMANNO 303 -0.065 -0.548
FREDDA ANGELO 254 -0.722 0.11 INNOCENTI RENZO 304 -0.779 -0.083
FRIGATO GABRIELE 255 -0.746 -0.087 IOTTI LEONILDE 305 -0.814 -0.019
31Table 16: Individual MPs coordinates - Continued.
Fullname Code X1 X2 Fullname Code X1 X2
IZZO DOMENICO 306 -0.812 0.269 MANZIONE ROBERTO 357 -0.143 -0.524
IZZO FRANCESCA 307 -0.724 -0.181 MANZONI VALENTINO 358 0.445 -0.564
JANNELLI EUGENIO 308 -0.748 -0.073 MARENGO LUCIO 359 0.354 -0.531
JERVOLINO ROSA 309 -0.78 -0.056 MARIANI PAOLA 360 -0.759 -0.085
LAMALFA GIORGIO 310 -0.758 -0.616 MARINACCI NICANDRO 361 0.081 -0.208
LARUSSA IGNAZIO 311 0.338 -0.135 MARINI FRANCO 362 -0.787 -0.198
LABATE GRAZIA 312 -0.74 -0.154 MARINO GIOVANNI 363 0.321 -0.448
LADU SALVATORE 313 -0.741 -0.093 MARONGIU GIANNI 364 -0.722 0.101
LAMACCHIA BONAVENTURA 314 -0.78 -0.102 MARONI ROBERTO 365 0.814 0.581
LANDI GIAMPAOLO 315 0.49 -0.376 MAROTTA RAFFAELE 366 0.175 -0.154
LANDOLFI MARIO 316 0.398 -0.45 MARRAS GIOVANNI 367 0.276 -0.1
LAVAGNINI ROBERTO 317 0.203 -0.139 MARTINELLI PIERGIORGIO 369 0.814 0.58
LECCESE VITO 318 -0.943 0.145 MARTINI LUIGI 370 0.33 -0.428
LEMBO ALBERTO 319 0.754 0.352 MARTINO ANTONIO 371 0.361 -0.626
LENTI MARIA 320 -0.488 0.873 MARTUSCIELLO ANTONIO 372 0.251 -0.158
LENTO GUGLIELMO 321 -0.761 0.077 MARZANO ANTONIO 373 0.357 -0.302
LEONE ANTONIO 322 0.321 -0.185 MASELLI DOMENICO 374 -0.795 -0.077
LEONI CARLO 323 -0.753 -0.1 MASI DIEGO 375 -0.537 0.178
LICALZI MARIANNA 324 -0.412 -0.23 MASIERO MARIO 376 0.34 -0.339
LIOTTA SILVIO 325 -0.143 0.226 MASSA LUIGI 377 -0.759 -0.081
LOJUCCO DOMENICO 326 0.23 -0.146 MASSIDDA PIERGIORGIO 378 0.257 -0.097
LOPORTO GUIDO 327 0.352 -0.294 MASTELLA CLEMENTE 379 -0.372 -0.482
LOPRESTI ANTONINO 328 0.316 -0.55 MASTROLUCA FRANCESCO 380 -0.759 -0.085
LODDO ANTONIO 329 -0.651 -0.053 MATACENA AMEDEO 381 0.274 -0.255
LOMBARDI GIANCARLO 330 -0.752 0.056 MATRANGA CRISTINA 382 0.129 -0.095
LORENZETTI MARIARITA 331 -0.762 -0.056 MATTARELLA SERGIO 383 -0.78 -0.025
LORUSSO ANTONIO 332 0.287 -0.209 MATTEOLI ALTERO 384 0.268 -0.425
LOSURDO STEFANO 333 0.278 -0.45 MATTIOLI FRANCESCO 385 -0.773 -0.056
LUCA' MIMMO 334 -0.764 -0.092 MAURO MASSIMO 386 -0.824 -0.1
LUCCHESE PAOLO 335 0.163 -0.044 MAZZOCCHI ANTONIO 387 0.381 -0.62
LUCIDI MARCELLA 336 -0.769 -0.094 MAZZOCCHIN GIANANTONIO 388 -0.747 -0.084
LUMIA GIUSEPPE 337 -0.769 -0.066 MELANDRI GIOVANNA 389 -0.775 -0.032
LUONGO ANTONIO 338 -0.807 -0.422 MELOGRANI PIERO 390 0.248 -0.123
MACCANICO ANTONIO 339 -0.752 -0.074 MELONI GIOVANNI 391 -0.889 0.459
MAGGI ROCCO 340 -0.777 -0.06 MENIA ROBERTO 392 0.405 -0.531
MAIOLO TIZIANA 341 0.334 -0.039 MERLO GIORGIO 393 -0.757 -0.085
MAIONE FRANCESCO 342 0.328 -0.578 MERLONI FRANCESCO 394 -0.709 -0.053
MALAGNINO UGO 343 -0.756 0.086 MESSA VITTORIO 395 0.447 -0.427
MALAVENDA MARA 344 0.744 0.668 MICCICHE' GIANFRANCO 396 0.23 -0.108
MALENTACCHI GIORGIO 345 -0.47 0.883 MICHELANGELI MARIO 397 -0.866 0.422
MALGIERI GENNARO 346 0.346 -0.67 MICHELINI ALBERTO 398 0.145 0.009
MAMMOLA PAOLO 347 0.19 -0.19 MICHIELON MAURO 400 0.787 0.474
MANCA PAOLO 348 -0.671 0.111 MIGLIAVACCA MAURIZIO 401 -0.756 -0.081
MANCINA CLAUDIA 349 -0.778 0.003 MIGLIORI RICCARDO 402 0.297 -0.54
MANCUSO FILIPPO 350 0.481 0.148 MIRAGLIA NICOLA 403 -0.053 -0.581
MANGIACAVALLO ANTONINO 351 -0.81 -0.004 MISURACA FILIPPO 404 0.281 -0.242
MANTOVANI RAMON 353 -0.467 0.884 MITOLO PIETRO 405 0.414 -0.332
MANTOVANO ALFREDO 354 0.395 -0.316 MOLGORA DANIELE 406 0.773 0.635
MANZATO SERGIO 355 -0.759 -0.083 MOLINARI GIUSEPPE 407 -0.736 -0.097
MANZINI PAOLA 356 -0.743 0.023 MONACO FRANCESCO 408 -0.747 -0.155
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MONTECCHI ELENA 409 -0.804 -0.125 PECORAROSCANIO ALFONSO 459 -0.913 -0.408
MORGANDO GIANFRANCO 410 -0.759 -0.007 PECORELLA GAETANO 460 0.266 -0.178
MORONI ROSANNA 411 -0.874 0.487 PENNA RENZO 461 -0.758 -0.078
MORSELLI STEFANO 412 0.371 -0.597 PENNACCHI LAURA 462 -0.795 -0.141
MUSSI FABIO 413 -0.788 -0.091 PEPE ANTONIO 463 0.316 -0.58
MUSSOLINI ALESSANDRA 414 0.334 -0.598 PEPE MARIO 464 -0.763 0.003
MUZIO ANGELO 415 -0.846 0.521 PERETTI ETTORE 465 0.169 -0.055
NAN ENRICO 416 0.289 -0.289 PERUZZA PAOLO 466 -0.768 0.092
NANIA DOMENICO 417 0.309 -0.632 PETRELLA GIUSEPPE 467 -0.758 -0.082
NAPOLI ANGELA 418 0.426 -0.402 PETRINI PIERLUIGI 468 -0.877 0.13
NAPPI GIANFRANCO 419 -0.767 -0.097 PEZZOLI MARIO 469 0.392 -0.017
NARDINI MARIACELESTE 420 -0.481 0.877 PEZZONI MARCO 470 -0.752 -0.089
NARDONE CARMINE 421 -0.778 0.041 PICCOLO SALVATORE 471 -0.782 -0.095
NEGRI LUIGI 422 -0.394 -0.222 PILO GIOVANNI 472 0.318 -0.285
NERI SEBASTIANO 423 0.224 -0.518 PINZA ROBERTO 473 -0.754 -0.144
NESI NERIO 424 -0.903 0.43 PIROVANO ETTORE 474 0.697 0.717
NICCOLINI GUALBERTO 425 0.302 -0.153 PISANU BEPPE 475 0.293 -0.323
NIEDDA GIUSEPPE 426 -0.765 -0.081 PISAPIA GIULIANO 476 -0.491 0.871
NOCERA LUIGI 427 -0.189 -0.507 PISCITELLO RINO 477 -0.673 0.164
NOVELLI DIEGO 428 -0.832 0.145 PISTELLI LAPO 478 -0.751 -0.09
OCCHETTO ACHILLE 429 -0.721 -0.076 PISTONE GABRIELLA 479 -0.922 0.386
OCCHIONERO LUIGI 430 -0.679 -0.308 PITTELLA GIOVANNI 480 -0.74 -0.167
OLIVERIO GERARDO 431 -0.766 -0.042 PITTINO DOMENICO 481 0.762 0.609
OLIVIERI LUIGI 432 -0.761 -0.058 PIVA ANTONIO 482 0.257 0.04
OLIVO ROSARIO 433 -0.741 -0.157 PIVETTI IRENE 483 -0.326 -0.48
ORLANDO FEDERICO 434 -0.736 -0.057 POLENTA PAOLO 484 -0.741 -0.088
ORTOLANO DARIO 435 -0.861 0.466 POLIBORTONE ADRIANA 485 0.47 -0.572
OSTILLIO MASSIMO 436 -0.117 -0.559 POLIZZI ROSARIO 486 0.326 -0.261
OZZA EUGENIO 437 0.334 -0.412 POMPILI MASSIMO 487 -0.76 0.007
PACE CARLO 438 0.414 -0.523 PORCU CARMELO 488 0.411 -0.532
PACE GIOVANNI 439 0.362 -0.51 POSSA GUIDO 489 0.322 -0.251
PAGANO SANTINO 440 -0.209 -0.811 POZZA ELISA 490 -0.667 -0.242
PAGLIARINI GIANCARLO 441 0.821 0.563 PRESTAMBURGO MARIO 491 -0.741 -0.174
PAGLIUCA NICOLA 442 0.208 -0.201 PRESTIGIACOMO STEFANIA 492 0.242 -0.075
PAGLIUZZI GABRIELE 443 0.452 -0.415 PREVITI CESARE 493 0.208 -0.437
PAISSAN MAURO 444 -0.933 0.163 PROCACCI ANNAMARIA 494 -0.987 0.16
PALMA PAOLO 445 -0.807 -0.098 PRODI ROMANO 495 -0.743 -0.129
PALMIZIO MASSIMO 446 0.227 -0.174 PROIETTI LIVIO 496 0.394 -0.665
PALUMBO GIUSEPPE 447 0.245 -0.102 RABBITO GAETANO 497 -0.768 -0.084
PAMPO FEDELE 448 0.38 -0.555 RADICE ROBERTO 498 0.295 -0.158
PANATTONI GIORGIO 449 -0.779 -0.018 RAFFAELLI PAOLO 499 -0.782 -0.019
PANETTA GIOVANNI 450 0.076 -0.081 RAFFALDINI FRANCO 500 -0.759 -0.086
PAOLONE BENITO 451 0.304 -0.398 RALLO MICHELE 501 0.413 -0.401
PARENTI TIZIANA 452 -0.18 -0.355 RANIERI UMBERTO 502 -0.78 -0.09
PARISI ARTURO 453 -0.869 -0.496 RASI GAETANO 503 0.381 -0.463
PAROLI ADRIANO 454 0.251 -0.131 RAVA LINO 504 -0.758 -0.085
PAROLO UGO 455 0.806 0.536 REBECCHI ALDO 505 -0.799 -0.376
PARRELLI ENNIO 456 -0.787 -0.085 REBUFFA GIORGIO 506 0.021 -0.149
PASETTO GIORGIO 457 -0.763 -0.062 REPETTO ALESSANDRO 507 -0.752 -0.074
PASETTO NICOLA 458 0.478 -0.592 RICCI MICHELE 508 -0.757 0.176
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RICCIO EUGENIO 509 0.476 -0.675 SCHMID SANDRO 560 -0.774 -0.088
RICCIOTTI PAOLO 510 -0.557 0.199 SCIACCA ROBERTO 561 -0.771 -0.091
RISARI GIANNI 511 -0.701 -0.253 SCOCA MARETTA 562 -0.166 -0.434
RIVA LAMBERTO 512 -0.736 -0.243 SCOZZARI GIUSEPPE 563 -0.708 0.064
RIVELLI NICOLA 513 0.286 0.071 SCRIVANI OSVALDO 564 -0.768 -0.08
RIVERA GIOVANNI 514 -0.781 -0.139 SEDIOLI SAURO 565 -0.759 -0.083
RIVOLTA DARIO 515 0.28 -0.126 SELVA GUSTAVO 566 0.358 -0.532
RIZZA ANTONIETTA 516 -0.715 -0.112 SERAFINI ANNAMARIA 567 -0.75 -0.066
RIZZI CESARE 517 0.74 0.562 SERRA ACHILLE 568 0.145 -0.047
RIZZO ANTONIO 518 0.377 -0.588 SERVODIO GIUSEPPINA 569 -0.816 -0.1
RIZZO MARCO 519 -0.843 0.538 SESTINI GRAZIA 570 0.261 0.078
RODEGHIERO FLAVIO 520 0.806 0.437 SETTIMI GINO 571 -0.757 -0.193
ROGNA SERGIO 521 -0.755 -0.16 SGARBI VITTORIO 572 0.071 0.03
ROMANI PAOLO 522 0.262 -0.109 SICA VINCENZO 573 -0.79 -0.086
ROMANO DOMENICO 523 -0.729 -0.014 SIGNORINI STEFANO 574 0.609 0.572
ROSCIA DANIELE 524 0.576 0.806 SIGNORINO ELSA 575 -0.728 -0.072
ROSSETTO GIUSEPPE 525 0.276 -0.15 SIMEONE ALBERTO 576 0.33 -0.395
ROSSI EDO 526 -0.481 0.877 SINISCALCHI VINCENZO 577 -0.729 0.254
ROSSI GUIDO 527 0.799 0.004 SINISI GIANNICOLA 578 -0.706 -0.157
ROSSI ORESTE 528 0.645 0.76 SIOLA UBERTO 579 -0.751 -0.201
ROSSIELLO GIUSEPPE 529 -0.757 -0.082 SOAVE SERGIO 580 -0.752 0.101
ROSSO ROBERTO 530 0.349 -0.028 SODA ANTONIO 581 -0.745 -0.044
ROTUNDO ANTONIO 531 -0.745 -0.001 SOLAROLI BRUNO 582 -0.759 -0.044
RUBERTI ANTONIO 532 -0.757 0.017 SORIERO GIUSEPPE 583 -0.736 -0.195
RUBINO ALESSANDRO 533 0.313 -0.146 SORO ANTONELLO 584 -0.735 -0.095
RUBINO PAOLO 534 -0.781 0.12 SOSPIRI NINO 585 0.369 -0.47
RUFFINO ELVIO 535 -0.762 -0.074 SPINI VALDO 586 -0.743 -0.07
RUGGERI RUGGERO 536 -0.764 -0.247 STAGNO FRANCESCO 587 0.284 -0.2
RUSSO PAOLO 537 0.25 -0.165 STAJANO ERNESTO 588 -0.623 0.125
RUZZANTE PIERO 538 -0.761 -0.09 STANISCI ROSA 589 -0.759 -0.082
SABATTINI SERGIO 539 -0.742 -0.069 STEFANI STEFANO 590 0.756 0.427
SAIA ANTONIO 540 -0.888 0.46 STELLUTI CARLO 591 -0.76 -0.079
SALES ISAIA 541 -0.701 -0.097 STORACE FRANCESCO 592 0.39 -0.56
SALVATI MICHELE 542 -0.699 0.051 STRADELLA FRANCESCO 593 0.34 -0.09
SANTANDREA DANIELA 543 0.774 0.633 STRAMBI ALFREDO 594 -0.915 0.404
SANTORI ANGELO 545 0.222 -0.143 STUCCHI GIACOMO 595 0.823 0.569
SANZA ANGELO 546 -0.115 -0.356 SUSINI MARCO 596 -0.76 -0.073
SAONARA GIOVANNI 547 -0.692 0.094 TABORELLI ALBERTO 597 0.265 -0.155
SAPONARA MICHELE 548 0.209 -0.203 TARADASH MARCO 598 0.393 -0.185
SARACA GIANFRANCO 549 -0.211 -0.351 TARDITI VITTORIO 599 0.25 -0.19
SARACENI LUIGI 550 -0.858 0.132 TARGETTI FERDINANDO 600 -0.751 -0.03
SAVARESE ENZO 551 0.304 -0.5 TASSONE MARIO 601 0.038 -0.055
SAVELLI GIULIO 552 -0.081 -0.322 TATARELLA GIUSEPPE 602 0.342 -0.383
SBARBATI LUCIANA 553 -0.651 0.096 TATARELLA SALVATORE 603 0.414 -0.486
SCAJOLA CLAUDIO 554 0.096 -0.153 TATTARINI FLAVIO 604 -0.734 -0.042
SCALIA MASSIMO 555 -0.919 0.281 TERZI SILVESTRO 605 0.822 0.57
SCALTRITTI GIANLUIGI 556 0.237 -0.177 TESTA LUCIO 606 -0.723 -0.327
SCANTAMBURLO DINO 557 -0.813 0.087 TORTOLI ROBERTO 607 0.247 -0.15
SCARPA PAOLO 558 0.291 -0.145 TOSOLINI RENZO 608 0.417 -0.522
SCHIETROMA GIANFRANCO 559 -0.793 0.185 TRABATTONI SERGIO 609 -0.766 0.032
34Figure 6: Individual MPs coordinates - Continued.
Fullname Code X1 X2
TRANTINO ENZO 610 0.345 -0.478
TREMAGLIA MIRKO 611 0.428 -0.345
TREMONTI GIULIO 612 0.394 0
TREU TIZIANO 613 -0.786 -0.176
TRINGALI PAOLO 614 0.415 -0.62
TUCCILLO DOMENICO 615 -0.768 -0.112
TURCI LANFRANCO 616 -0.723 -0.196
TURCO LIVIA 617 -0.83 -0.107
TURRONI SAURO 618 -0.788 0.434
URBANI GIULIANO 619 0.206 -0.104
URSO ADOLFO 620 0.404 -0.52
VALDUCCI MARIO 621 0.251 -0.119
VALENSISE RAFFAELE 622 0.354 -0.511
VALETTO MARIAPIA 623 -0.778 -0.06
VALPIANA TIZIANA 624 -0.443 0.897
VANNONI MAURO 625 -0.764 -0.068
VASCON LUIGINO 626 0.784 0.582
VELTRI ELIO 627 -0.699 0.157
VELTRONI VALTER 628 -0.848 -0.29
VENDOLA NICHI 629 -0.505 0.863
VENETO ARMANDO 630 -0.753 -0.187
VENETO GAETANO 631 -0.77 -0.132
VENTURA MICHELE 632 -0.758 -0.335
VIALE EUGENIO 633 0.389 -0.146
VIGNALI ADRIANO 634 -0.756 -0.074
VIGNERI ADRIANA 635 -0.769 -0.247
VIGNI FABRIZIO 636 -0.762 -0.067
VILLETTI ROBERTO 637 -0.77 0.123
VISCO VINCENZO 638 -0.771 -0.216
VITA VINCENZO 639 -0.729 -0.094
VITALI LUIGI 640 0.239 -0.112
VITO ELIO 641 0.202 -0.165
VOGLINO VITTORIO 642 -0.794 -0.09
VOLONTE' LUCA 643 -0.045 -0.256
VOLPINI DOMENICO 644 -0.754 -0.101
VOZZA SALVATORE 645 -0.774 -0.075
WIDMANN JOHANNGEORG 646 -0.785 0.171
ZACCHEO VINCENZO 647 0.364 -0.612
ZACCHERA MARCO 648 0.297 -0.362
ZAGATTI ALFREDO 649 -0.742 -0.093
ZANI MAURO 650 -0.759 -0.07
ZELLER KARL 651 -0.781 0.14
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